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INTRODUCTION
The search for more effective and reliable measures of
depression continues, as evidenced by the development of new tests
and evaluative procedures to deal with this problem.

With the

increasing emphasis on depressive phenomenon (Secunda, 1973), this
issue will receive considerable attention.

There are many problems

encountered by those attempting to define and measure depression
that have resulted in vague or equivocal research findings.

Some

of these problems involve the definition and understanding of the
term "depression" itself, and others involve particular problems of
measurement.

The focus of the present study will be on the latter,

specifically with the problem of test faking.
The term 11 depression11 has caused much confusion and has
contributed to many unclear research questions, and hence equivocal
results.

Depression is meant, at different times, to refer to:

1) a particular feeling or emotion, 2) a symptom or symptom·complex,
and 3) a well defined clinical or psychiatric entity.

F'ailure to

operationally define the intended meaning of depression can result
in theoretical confusion and in the choice of inappropriate research
instruments.

Fortunately, most of the standard depression scales

have clearly defined what they measure as

11

depression", usually

referring to a psychiatric entity wi.th certain symptoms or symptom
patterns (Zung, 1974a).
Once this initial definition is made, however, there are
1

2

still many issues to be considered.

There are different systems

for the classification of depression which are based on various
dimensions within the depressive disorder.

Definitions based on

etiology have resulted in the distinction between endogenous and
,. · # . '
,;..~

reactive depressions.

Definitions based on the severity of the

impairment to reality testing functions have resulted in the distinction between psychotic and neurotic depressions.

The bipolar

versus unipolar distinction is made on the basis of past history,
and often on the response to differential medication.
These distinctions within the clinical entity of depression
complicate matters for researchers utilizing depression scales. -How
can depression best be defined for a particular study, and which
measurement best taps that particular dimension?

Often, subjects

labelled "depressed" by any of several criteria are presumably combined to form "depressed" subject groups, although such techniques
tend to dilute the practical significance of research findings.
One alternative offered by Zung (1965, 1973) is to simply
inventory the presence and severity of major depressive symptoms,
and thereby provide a quantitative measurement of the strength of
the disorder •. Such a technique avoids making the theoretical distinctions reviewed above, and allows a particular depression scale
to be useful in many different applications, even though they may
be based on different theoretical foundations.
assumption

behL~d

This is the basic

the development of the Zung Self-rating Depression

Scale (1965).
The Self-rating Depression Scale (SDS) is a short, self-

3

report measurement of the presence and/or strength of depressive
symptoms.

Research suggests that the SDS may be an effective and

reliable tool in the measurement of depression, useful in both
clinical and research settings.

However, there are still questions
~-;

to be considered.

One of the serious problems facing self-report

measures (such as the SDS) is that of test faking--the issue to
which this investigation is directed.
the fakability of the Zung SDS.

The present study concerns

Faking is a threat to the validity

of test information, defined as the deliberate biasing of test responses in order to manipulate the impression given by the test
results.

It has been studied in connection with many personality

and diagnostic instruments, and is often investigated in the process
of establishing the validity of such personality measurements.
As a self-report scale, the SDS might be open to direct
subject manipulation.

Such manipulation would result in invalid

diagnostic information and could conceivably lead to inappropriate
treatment decisions in clinical settings.

In research applications,

SDS faking could result in unexplainable experimental findings.
manipulation might take two forms.

Test

Non-depressed persons could fake

in the more depressed direction (referred to as "faking-bad" in the
literature) for purposes of malingering, maintaining dependency on
hospital status, or perhaps as support for seeking advantages from
the "sick role", such as attempting to qualify for undeserved disability benefits.
On

the other hand, depressed persons might fake test scores

in the less depressed direction (referred to as

11

faking-good") to

4
distort the information obtained on screening batteries, in order
to avoid appropriate treatment for depression, or to secure early
and premature discharge from hospitalization.
The research investigating test faking on the SDS (Mikesell

& Calhoun, 1969; Swanson & Anderson, 1972) has not provided a satisfactory examination of the question.

It has been reported that

subjects were successful in mainpulating SDS scores toward the more
depressed direction but not toward the less depressed direction,
and no explanation has been offered for this finding that runs
counter to the literature on the faking of other personality inventories.

In many other cases, subjects can fake test results in both

directions at will (Cronbach, 1972).

It is hypothesized that these

results were due to design characteristics of the studies involved
which rendered the 3fforts of fake-good subjects nonsignificant.
To test the suggestion that subjects can fake the SDS in both the
more and less·depressed directions, revised experimental instructions
will be employed

~

attenuate these design characteristics.

It is

hypothesized in this study that subjects will score significantly
higher SDS scores than controls when asked to fake in the more
depressed direction, and significantly lower SDS scores than controls
when asked to fake in the less depressed direction.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
BACK GROUND OF THE SDS
The Self-rating Depression Scale (SDS) was developed by
Zung (1965) in order to meet the clinical and research needs for
a quick, reliable and relatively theory-free measurement of depression.

It is a symptom based inventory that quantitatively measures

the strength of major depressive symptoms.

In the process of doing

so, it defines depression as a psychiatric disorder that is characterized by certain specific symptom patterns.

After making this

initial assumption, the SDS remains relatively atheoretical in that

it does not distinguish between the previously mentioned conceptual
entities within the depressive disorder {eg., endogenous versus
reactive; psychotic versus neurotic; etc.).

It simply identifies

the presence and strength of major depressive symptoms.

It is

designed to monitor only those symptoms specifically linked to the
diagnosis of depression, and to avoid the confusion that cru1 ensue
when other commonly-seen symptoms are not factored out--such as
signs of anxiety, usually seen in depressed patients, but also seen
in most all psychiatric and emotional disorders.

In fact, Zung has

developed a Self-rating Anxiety Scale (SAS) to monitor the presence
of anxiety as a distinct, though often parallel phenomenon (Zung,

1974a).
In deciding which symptoms to include in the SDS (and which

5
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to include in his definition of depression), Zung relied on the work
of previous investigators who had reviewed and summarized research
findings on depression.

Grinker, et al (1961) used factor analysis

in their investigation of depressive symptoms, attempting to iden-

tify the underlying factors or patterns of the disorder.

They fac-

tored out five such feeling patterns often mentioned by depressives,
and 10 behavioral factors derived from a behavioral checklist.

Grin-

ker's five feeling patterns were: dismal, hopeless feelings; concern
over material loss; guilt over wong doing; anxiety; and demanding,
angry feelings.

The 10 behavioral factors were: isolation, with-

eli-awl, retardation of speech and thought, disinterest and apathy,
demanding and angry, hypochondriachal complaints, cognitive disturbances, agitation, rigidity and immobility, clinging and pleading,
and somatic disturbances.
In a similar cataloguing of depressive symptomatology, Overall (1962) employed 31 depressive measures and singled out seven

major factors which underlied most of the 5,1mptoms he observed.
These seven factors were: depression in mood, guilt, anxiety and
apprehension, psychomotor retardation, subjective experiences of
impairment, abnormal preoccupation with physical health, and physical
responses to stress (such as loss of appetite, sleep and weight).
In a third review cited by Zung in developing the SDS,
r

Friedman, et al (1963) studied the symptom complaints, test scores,
and trait ratings of 170 hospitalized psychotic depressives.

They

employed rather stringent criteria for subject selection in order
to restrict their study to symptoms characteristic of depression only.

7

They determined 22 symptoms and trait variables seen most often in
their depressed sample and factor analyzed them.

The analysis

described four main factors which they referred to as "types" of
depression.

The four "types" were: 1) a classical mood or affective

disturbance with guilt, loss of self-esteem, and tendencies to
internalize feelings; 2) a retarded and withdrawn type; 3) a primarily biological reaction with loss of appetite, sleep, etc.; and

4) a querulous, hypochondriacal type characterized as demanding,
self-preoccupied and complaining.

It is unclear whether these four

factors in depressive symptoms were independent enough to be seen
asdifferent

11

types 11 of depression, or whether they were simply

different aspects of depressive manifestations attributed to all
depressives.
It is important to note about these reviews that they all
are factor analytic studies, and as such have an inherent problem.
The factors derived in this type of analysis depend to a high degree
on the symptoms and traits included by the investigators.

Therefore,

the resultant factors may simply reflect the clinical observations
and hypotheses of the experimenters.

Because of this aspect of

factor analysis, these studies should be interpreted as a quantitative reflection of the prevalent psychiatric diagnostic and observational process.

The fact that each of these studies arrives at
'

similar factors or patterns in depressive symptoms suggests a uniformity in the observational techniques of the different investigators, and may also suggest a general psychiatric consensus about
these manifestations of depressive disorders.

8

Zung used these factor analytic studies (Friedman, et al.,
1963; Grinker, et al., 1961; Overall, 1962) as a basis for choosing
which symptoms to monitor with the SDS.

He combined many of the

conclusions of the previous reviews as his criteria for diagnosing
a depressive disorder (Zung, 1965).

His criteria (detailed in

Appendix A) are divided into the following four categories: 1) a
pervasive affective disturbance (depressed mood), 2) physiological
symptoms (variations in sleep, appetite, or other biological symptoms), 3)

psychomoto~

disturbances (either retardation or agitation),

and 4) psychological disturbances (such as hopelessness, confusion,
irritability, and suicidal ruminations).

These characteristics

became Zung's (1973) operational definition of a depressive disorder:
a psychiatric disorder characterized by these four types of disturbances.

In evaluating the literature on the symptomatology of

depression, Zung's criteria seem to adequately cover the range of
symptoms usually presented by patients later diagnosed as depressed.
In addition, symptoms strongly related to somatic anxiety are kept
to a minimum, presumably to keep depression and anxiety as separately
measured disorders.
The SDS comprises 20 items, each representing one of the
"characteristic" symptoms of depression.

The items were derived

from verbatim records of patient interview material.
are listed in Appendix B.

The test items

In taking the SDS, a patient is asked to

rate each of the items as to how it applies to him at the time of
testing with these quantitative terms:

none or a little of the time,

some of the time, a good part of the time, or most or all of the time.
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Zung (1973) claims that the use of an even number of response categories is an attempt to prevent subjects from checking the middle
answers in hopes of appearing 11 average 11 •

However, this claim seems

spurious because a test protocol composed of center-marked responses
(if possible) would yield a score in the diagnosed depressed range.

RESEARCH WITH THE SDS
Zung (1965) reported validation data for the SDS from a
population .of 56 psychiatric patients admitted to a VA hospital
with a primary diagnosis of depressive disorder.

Of these 56, 31

were eventually treated and discharged as having depressive disorders, and obtained an

averag~

SDS index of 74 before treatment,

and 39 after treatment (usually the day before discharge).

The

other 25 original patients were further evaluated and rediagnosed
and treated as having other psychiatric disorders.
diagnosed group obtained a mean SDS index of 53.

This otherAs a normal control

group, Zung tested 100 individuals, composed more or less equally
of professional staff, nonporfessional staff_and patients hospitalized for other reasons in various medical wards, who were
observable symptoms of depression(p. 66) 11 •

11

free from

This normal group

obtained a mean SDS index of 33, with scores ranging from 25 to 43.

An important criticism of this study, and 9ne which relates
to other validation research concerns the definition of "depressed"
patients.

Zung (1965) described the criteria for inclusion into the

subject population as diagnosis of a "depressive disorder".

It is

unclear what was diagnosed as a depressive disorder and which tra-

10
ditional diagnostic groups were included in the subject population.
Such a problem must be seen as a major weakness in the validation
research in the SDS.
Further research with the SDS (Zung, Richards & Short, 1965)
reported experience with the SDS in an outpatient setting.

A sample

of 152 outpatients was given the SDS and MMPI; results showed that
patients diagnosed as having psychoneurotic depressive reactions
obtained a mean SDS index of 64, while several other diagnostic
groups all obtained mean indices from 53 to 55.

These figures

compare quite closely with those previously reported (Zung, 1965).
In addition, the SDS correlated highest with the MMPI D scale (r=
0.70) and Pt scale (r=0.68), and

expect~dly

lowest with the Ma scale

(r=0.13).
Zung (1969) reported data from a cross-cultural study using
collaborators from Australia, Czechoslovakia, England, Germany,
Japan and Switzerland.

The sample included 1,043 patients and 364

controls ("normals") who took the SDS.

He reported that patients

rated by a psychiatrist as having "mild to moderate depressions"
had SDS indices between 50 and 59, patients with "moderate to severe
depressions" scores between €JJ and 69, and patients rated as having
"severe depressions" obtained indices of 70 and above.

The mean

control group ("normal") score was 37 in this cross-cultural study,
.

somewhat higher than the initial report of 33

I

(Zung~

1965).

In two later reports about the incidence of depression in
the normal population, Zung (1971, 1972b) noted another revision
of the "normal" SDS mean score.

In combining much of the data he

11

had previously collected, he reported that the normal SDS index
was 39 (standard deviation

= 10),

which he believes is more repre-

sentative of the normal population than the original estimate.
Based on this data, Zung concluded that depression as a clinical
entity is not a feature of the normal population between the ages
of 20 and 64.

When looking at subjects under 19 and over 65, he

also maintains that depression as a clinical entity is not normal;
however, the data suggests that the baseline is higher in these
extreme age groups, and any cutoff score for diagnosing depression
is liable to incorrectly label more younger and older subjects as
depressed.

A morbidity cutoff score of 50 on the SDS correctly

identified 88% of all depressed patients in his sample, and missed
12% of the depressed subjects.

This sample was not controlled for

age, and included subjects of all age groups.

This, of course, is

a statistical.statement of the "normality" of depression; that
depression as diagnosed by the SDS represents less than 50% of the
population at large.

It does not refer to any other possible mani-

festations of depression, such as the experiences of depression in
normal adults (Blatt, D'Afflitti & Quinlan, 1976).
It mnst be noted that in this validation research, SDS scores
were measured against a variety of diagnostic criteria.

In the

original inpatient (Zung, 1965) and outpatient (Zung, Richards

&

Short, 1965) samples, admitting and discharge diagnoses were used as
validating criteria.

In the cross-cultural study (Zung, 1969), psy-

chiatrists' global ratings of depression were used.

In a study of

the incidence of depression in the normal population (Zung, 1971),

12
11

normalit~'

was defined as the capacity to work, and normal subjects

were selected by testing all staff personnel who showed up for work
on predetermined days.

Because of the wide disparity in evaluative

criteria, evaluators' training, and use of diagnostic terminology,
such results can only be seen as rough guidelines for the use of
SDS scores in actual clinical settings.

Furthermore, because the

SDS is a symptomatic inventory, it does not distinguish between
theoretical entities within the depressive phenomenon (eg., psychotic versus neurotic, and endogenous versus reactive depressions).
In the cases where psychiatric diagnoses were used as validating
criteria, investigators have presumably combined all types of
depressive diagnoses into one research category: depressive disorder.
This ·makes practical sense

~n

that the SDS is designed to measure

simply the strength of all major depressive symptoms, which are
likely to be presented by both psychotic and neurotic depressives;
but such a practice also ignores the theoretical assumptions of the
original diagnosticians.

In any case, this initial validation

research, using as it does many types of criteria, does suggest
that the SDS measures what is widely labelled as depression.

The

diversity of validating criteria may even strengthen this suggestion.
It is also worthy of note that patients with primary diagnoses other than depression are apt to score in the elevated ranges
on the SDS.

Zung's (1965) group of inpatients eventually diagnosed

and treated as having other psychiatric disorders obtained a mean
SDS index of 53 (range 38-71) which falls into the mild to moderately
depressed range, as delineated in the manual.

This, however, is to

13
be expected because many of the symptoms of depression are present
in a variety of other disorders, and because depression itself is
a feature of many psychiatric problems.

In such cases, the SDS

functions by measuring the depressive symptoms or trends in patients
with other primary diagnoses.
Zung (1965) reports no reliability data with the original
scale, an ommision which was labelled as
in his review of the SDS (1972).

11

inexcusable" by Goldstein

However, in a later publication

concerning the Depression Status Inventory, Zung (1972a) provides
some data about the reliability of the SDS.

He reported that the

split-half reliability correlation for the SDS was 0.73 (p < .01).
Although a more extensive statement is clearly needed about the
scale's reliability, this is the only data published to date.
Other research with the SDS has explored its relation to
various personality and demographic variables.

Zung (1967a) reported

that the SDS does not correlate significantly with age, sex, marital
status, educational level, financial status, or intelligence.
ever, several qualifications must be added to these claims.

HowAll

subjects were required to pass the Ohio Literacy Test before taking
the SDS, and hence the lower extremes of the educational and intelligence level variables were not examined.

And in terms of the SDS's

relation to patient age, the sample ranged in age from 20 to 64,

.

and therefore any effects in younger and older subjects were not
observable.

As was reviewed before, there is evidence to suggest

higher baseline scores in subjects over the age of 65.

Zung (1967b)

reported that in a sample of 169 11 normal 11 older subjects (aged 65-95),

14
the mean SDS index was 48 (standard deviation = 10.5) with a range
of 25 to 80.

What accounted for these elevated scores in older

subjects was primarily their ratings of biological items reflecting
the ageing process, such as reduced appetite, sleep, libido and
activity levels.

In light of this, such elevations would be ex-

pected in older subjects, and in any subjects experiencing major
physiological changes, such as disabled individuals.
The relationship between the SDS and other commonly-used
depression measurements has also been explored (Brown & Zung, 1972;
Zung, 1967a, 1969; Zung, Richards & Short, 1965).

Correlations be-

.tween the SDS and various scales of the }MPI have been reported;
correlations with the D scale ranging from 0.59 to 0.70, correlation
with the

~~

scale (presumably measuring different, often opposite

symptoms) expectedly low at 0.13, and correlation with the Pt scale
of 0.68.

The high correlation between the SDS and the Pt scale

(Zung, Richards & Short, 1965) is explained by the suggestion that
the MMPI 1 s D and Pt scales tap many of the same symptoms.

In this

particular study, they correlated 0.79 with each other.
In addition, the above literature details correlations between the SDS and other depression scales.

Zung (1969) reports

correlations between the SDS and the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression of 0.56, between the SDS and the Beck

In~entory

of Depres-

sion of 0.72 and 0.76, between the SDS and Lubin's Depression Adjectives Check List of 0.29, and between the SDS and the Eysenck
Personality Inventory of -0.08.
Zung (1969, 1973) interprets this data as suggesting

tr~t
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the SDS correlates highly with specific depression rating scales
(eg., MMPI-D, Hamilton, or Beck) but correlates to a low degree with
nonspecific scales (eg., DACL or EPI).

This is because "specific"

scales are objective and quantitative measurements of certain symptoms, and yield a numerical score describing the severity of depression affecting an individual.

They ask the same types of questions,

use the same type of data, and offer the same type of determination-a numerical description of the strength of the symptom picture.
"Nonspecific" scales, on the other hand, are often more global in
nature and attempt to measure depression in more indirect ways.
What these results suggest is that specific depression rating scales
may measure different aspects of depression than nonspecific techniques.

The SDS is a specific, symptom-based measurement, and hence

correlates highly with others of its kind:

the MMPI-D, Hamilton,

and Beck.
In clinical research, the SDS was used to predict the type
of treatment given to depressed Fatients, differentiating between
those receiving ECT and those given anti-depressant medication alone
(Zung & Wonnacott, 1970).

Results indicated that the SDS could

distinguish between the two groups of patients, and that the factors
related to the type of treatment administered were: those receiving
ECT emphasized the biological items on the SDS, while those treated
'

only with medication endorsed more of the psychological symptoms of
the SDS.

In another "applied" study, the SDS was used successfully

as a screening device to identify those 5th and 6th graders who
were rated by their teachers as having potential adjustment problems

16
(Ivanoff, Layman & Von Singer, 1973) •
Summary

The SDS is a short, 20 item self-rating depression

scale~

It defines a depressive disorder as a psychiatric entity characterized
by: 1) a mood disturbance (sadness, depression), 2) physiological
symptoms (loss of appetite, sleep, libido, etc.), 3) psychomotor
agitation or retardation, and 4) psychological disturbances (such
as confusion, irritability, suicidal ruminations, etc.).

The SDS

is designed to measure the presence and/or strength of major depressive symptoms and yield a quantitative description of the severity
of the depressive disorder.
Research with the SDS suggests that it reliably distinguishes
those patients labelled depressed (by a variety of criteria) both
from nondepressed normals, and from patients having other psychiatric
disorders.

Depressive disorders, as measured by the SDS are not a

feature of the normal population, although baseline SDS scores may
be elevated in subjects under the age of 20 and over the age of 65.
The SDS correlated highly with other depression measurements in use
(the Beck, Hamilton, and MMPI-D scales), and one can reasonably
assume that it is measuring the same phenomenon.

Its added benefit

is its simplicity and brevity, often a significant advantage when
testing severly disturbed individuals.
Because the SDS is a self-administered test without the
benefit of a validity scale (like the MMPI 1 s), it is important to
explore the possibility that patients may fake test results to look
more or less depressed than is indicated.

This can become of
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practical importance when it is noted that the SDS might be used to
determine the type of treatment administered to incoming patients,
or to monitor the course of ongoing treatment.

In such cases, de-

liberately manipulated test scores may result in inappropriate treatment decisions.

In research a~plications, deliberately biased test

results may lead to invalid data correlations or interpretations.
There is a large body of research on the faking of test
results that suggests such manipulation is often accomplished quite
easily.

Some of this literature is reviewed below.

LITERATURE ON TEST FAKING
Faking is a threat to the validity of test results, and is
defined as

deliberat~

manipulation of test data in order to distort

or bias the resultant information.

Such manipulation often takes

two forms: oiasing test results to look more abnormal than is actually
the case (referred to as faking

11

bad 11 in the literature), or biasing

test data to appear less abnormal or more socially desirable (referred to as faking "good") • Faking in either direction may have advantages in certain situations.
11

Non-depressed persons might fake

bad 11 on depression inventories to prolong hospitalization, or to

maintain various benefits of the sick role.
fake

11

Depressed persons might

good" on a depression inventory in order to avoid treatment,

secure premature discharge from treatment, or perhaps to distort
the information revealed on initial screening batteries.
The research on test manipulation indicates that subjects
have often biased their test scores in order to influence the im-

18

pressions given on many different tests and inventories.

In research

dealing with common diagnostic and personality measurements, the
paradigm usually involves giving instructions to answer the test
items as if describing a certain kind of person, or in order to
emphasize a certain quality to the examiner.
illustrate the point.

Some examples will

Gendreau, Irvine and Kinght (1973) reported

that their subjects (Canadian prison inmates) were able to significantly alter test scores in the MMPI in order to appear
and less abnormal than control subjects.

both~

Several studies have demon-

strated the fakability of the Gordon Personality Inventory toward
both normal and abnormal-looking profiles (Braun & Farrell, 1974;
Schwab, 1971, 1974).

In these studies, experimental fake-bad groups

were asked to respond as an emotionally disturbed individual might.
Fake-good groups were asked to respond as a happy, well-adjusted
individual might.

In all cases, the experimental groups were able

to significantly alter their scores in the appropriate directions.
Forced-choice inventories, such as the Edwards Personality
Preference Scales (EPPS), are thought to be more resistant to faking
efforts (Cronbach, 1972).

This is because the process of faking

involves perception of the more socially desirable responses, and
then choice of these responses over the less socially desirable ones.
In forced-choice situations, responses are matched for degree of
I

social desirability, hence one cannot readily choose simply the more
desirable responses to influence the test results.

Faking on forced-

choice instruments involves manipulation toward particular attributes
that are not matched in the preparation of response pairs.

For
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example, a subject might succeed in attempting to bias answers to
the EPPS to appear more flexible or aggressive, because these attributes are not matched on the EPPS--responses are matched only for
social desirability.

However, even with these constraints, subjects

have demonstrated successful manipulation on a number of EPPS scales
(Braun & Tinley, 1972; Kirchner, 1962) •
The literature is replete with examples of successful manipulation on many commonly-used instruments.

Subjects have demon-

strated the faking of scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale by
exaggerating their signs of stress (Smith, 1974).

Braun and Smith

(1973) reported significant faking on the Self-Perception Inventory
by asking subjects to create "most favorable" and "least favorable"
impressions of themselves.

Gayton, Ozman and Wilson (1973) reported

that subjects could fake the Psychological Screening Inventory, and
interestingly, faked "bad" more convinvingly than they could fake
in the "good" dirrection.

Braun, Iervolino and Francis (1973) ex-

plored faking on the Comrey Personality Scales and reported that
subjects could fake
sion" of themselves.

11

good'' when asked to make an "excellent impresHowever, they noted that the faking-detection

scales of the Comrey were useful in monitoring test protocols, even
when subjects were told of them and asked to fake in such a way as.
to evade detection.

The faking-detection scale identified 54-64%

of those subjects who were deliberately manipulating their scores.
In addition, Cronbach (1972) describes successful faking
on several other personality and interest questionnaires.

He even

reports that subjects have demonstrated the ability to fake person-
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ality tests in order to appear as idealized salesmen when applying
for sales jobs.

Such manipulation involves complex skills and the

ability to formulate particular personality patterns in terms of
test responses.
Summary

This body of research on the faking of test results indicates
that subjects can often manipulate the impressions they give on many
standard personality inventories.

They can appear more or less ab-

normal, either rigid or flexible, and can even mimic the response
patterns of certain stereotyped persons (eg., salesmen).

Some in-

struments, however, are more difficult to fake than others.

It is

difficult to control test faking, and many test designers have responded by developing validity or faking-detection scales within
the body of the particular test (such as the MMPI's F, L, and K
scales).

Many other tests, however, have no faking-detection measure-

ments; the SDS is one such test.

When using instruments without

validity scales, it becomes more important to understand the limits
of fakability of the particular inventory.

This involves knowing

if a certain measurement can be faked, in which directions (or toward
which characteristics), and to what extent.

The investigations of

faking on the SDS have yielded inconclusive results.
FAKING ON THE SDS
Mikesell and Calhoun (1969) explored faking on the SDS with
150 high school students asked to complete the depression scale
under common faking instructions.

The control group was asked to
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"answer the items truthfully".

Fake-good subjects (those asked to

fake test results in the less depressed direction) were asked to
"answer the items so as to give people the most favorable impression
of you; try to answer as if you are a completely happy and welladjusted person without any problems".
structed to fake in the

~

The fake-bad subjects (in-

depressed direction) were asked to

"answer the items so as to give people the worst possible impression;
try to answer as if you are a completely unhappy and severly maladjusted person with a lot of problems".

They reported that their

subjects could significantly alter their SDS scores in the more
depressed (fake-bad) direction, but could not fake significantly in
the less depressed (fake-good) direction.

They offered no explanation

for these interesting findings, only cautioning that it was quite
easy for subjects to appear unfavorable on the SDS.
In the process of the experiment, they also opened up a new
area of question for users of the SDS--applicability of the norms
with younger subjects.
11

Their control group (presumably reflecting

normal 11 high school scores) obtained a mean SDS index of 48; there

were no differences between male and female subjects.

This "normal"

mean is considerably higher than Zung's (1965) original report of 33,
and nears ranges defined as abnormal in the SDS manual (Zung, 1974b).
Zung's research (1969, 1973) suggests that an SDS score of 50 is the
lower limit of the range described as "mild to moderate" depression.
Zung, Richards and Short (1965) reported that a cutoff of 50 accurately identified 88% of their depressed patients and incorrectly
labelled 12% of the normals.

In the face of this, Mikesell and
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Calhoun's (1969) normal mean of 48 for high school subjects is
surprisingly high.
Although Zung (1969) originally claimed that SDS scores did
not correlate significantly with age, he has modified his position
in later publications (1973, 1974a) and suggests that there will
be more

11

incorrect hi ts 11 when standard SDS cutoffs are used with

younger individuals.

This appears to be due to a higher baseline

SDS level in younger subjects.

Mikesell and Calhoun called for an

investigation of norms for high school subjects to validate their
findings.

And since the SDS has been used in research with subjects

a:s young as 10 years old, extended norms are clearly needed.

Swanson and Anderson (1972) refined the Mikesell and Calhoun
design in hopes of explaining why previous subjects had successfully
manipulated the SDS only in the more depressed direction.

They

hypothesized that instructing the test subjects as to the nature of
the SDS might facilitate their efforts to manipulate test scores
toward less depressed results.

They used junior college students

as subjects (mean age= 22.1 years), and added two additional groups
to the design; an extra fake-good and fake-bad group which were told
that the SDS measured depression when interpreted by a psychologist.
The information on the nature of the SDS did not help, however, and
they reported results similar to Mikesell and Calhoun.

Subjects

altered their scores significantly in the

~depressed

direction,

but not in the less depressed direction.

Using a different popula-

tion, they could not examine the question of inflated norms for high
school students raised by Hikesell and Calhoun.

Their college con-
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trol group obtained a mean SDS index of 35, similar to Zung's original estimate of 33.

They also used the same faking instructions

as before, so that any possible inhibitory effect of the particular
instructions remains unexplored.
Why have researchers been able to demonstrate faking on the
SDS only toward more depressed scores?

One possible explanation is

that people may have a clearer idea of what is abnormal than of what
is normal, and hence, it is easier for them to fake bad than to fake
good.

This explanation seems unlikely in vie1,1 of the large body of

research on the faking of other tests.

In most all such research,

faking was demonstrated in the "positive" or normal direction as
well as in the "negative" or abnormal direction.

On these tests and

inventories, subjects have demonstrated the ability to ferret out
socially desirable responses; it seems unlikely that the SDS is
radically different in this respect.

In fact, oany of its items

are identical to those on, for instance, the MMPI, which has been
successfully faked in the more normal direction (Gendreau, Irvine

& Knight, 1973).
A similar argument suggests that using normal subjects to

fake "more normal" will predictably lead to insignificant results.
However, this appraisal of the experimental procedures is inaccurate.
Normal subjects are asked to appear less depressed than is normal
(by describing an unrealistically happy pers?n)--which takes into
account the baserate of depressive symptomatology in the normal
population.

As argued above, the successful paradigm followed in

other faking research has been to use normal subjects to manipulate
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tests in both abnormal and idealized-normal directions.

Such an

explanation fails to detail why this paradigm has proved successful
with the faking of other tests, but not with the SDS.
Another possible explanation for the demonstration

o~

faking

only in the more depressed direction is statistical in nature.

With

a control group mean SDS index of 35 (Swanson & Anderson, 1972),
there is less "room" for manipulation of scores toward the lower,
less depressed end of the scale (25) than toward the more depressed
end (100).

Thus, a bottoming-out effect might reduce the significance

of faking good efforts on the SDS.

Inconsistent with this explana-

tion, however, is the fact that subjects in the Mikesell and Calhoun
(1969) study failed to fake significantly lower than their control
group, which had the unusually high mean of LJ3.

In this instance,

there would have been no bottoming-out phenomenon operating to inhibit faking good, and yet the fake-good group still failed to score
significantly lower than controls.

In sum, this statistical con-

straint may have effected the Swanson and Anderson (1972) study, but
not the Mikesell and Calhoun (1969) data.

The evidence does not yet

fully support this statistical interpretation.
Another possible explanation involves the experimental technique used in the two previous studies.

With both using the same

instructions and producing similarly unexplained results, it seems
'

possible that the instructional set somehow inhibited the fake-good
subjects and/or facilitated the fake-bad subjects.

It is hypothe-

sized that an interaction between the instructions used and the statistical constraints explained above prevented the demonstration of
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faking in the less depressed direction on the SDS.

Subjects instruct-

ed to fake less depressed (to answer as if they were completely happy
and well-adjusted) might have felt constrained to not seem "too obvious" or "too extreme" in their responses.

Such a constraint would

keep their scores tending toward the middle rather than the extremes
of the scoring range (marking 2's and 3's rather than 1's or 4's).
Because the control group mean is closer to the less depressed end
of the scale, one must respond to items in the extremes in order to
appear significantly less depressed than the already not too depressed
control subjects.

If such a set toward moderation in responding was

in fact operating, the efforts of fake-good subjects would remain
nonsignificant.
Psychiatric patients, on the other hand, would not be operating under the same perceived constraints, and their average scores
would fall more toward the depressed end of the scale.

The statis-

tical situation would be reversed and it would be easier for them to
fake in the less depressed direction.

In effect, they might fake

less depressed when our data from normal subjects indicates that the
SDS cannot be so manipulated.
To explore this possibility, it would be desirable to have
an actual patient population attempt to fake the SDS, but such a use
of patients might be questionable both in terms of ethical considerations and with regard to patient cooperation.

Depressed patients,

exhibiting lowered motivation and energy levels, might not be very
cooperative or invested in such a task where perceived benefit was
admittedly small.
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Using a student population, instead, to explore this issue,
as has already been done, requires some procedural modifications.
The experimental groups need to be given instructions that remove
some of the "restraints of moderation".

In such a way, we might

observe the potential of faking in the less depressed direction on
the SDS, rather than the attenuated performance of subjects inhibiting
their manipulatory abilities.
SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES
Research suggests that the Zung Self-rating Depression Scale
is a reliable and effective tool for the measurement of depressive
symptomatology.

It is quick to administer and has demonstrated the

ability to differentiate to an acceptable degree between individuals
with depressive disorders and those with other diagnoses.

It also

correlates favorably with other standard depression inventories.
However, because it is a self-report measure without the
benefit of validity or faking-detection scales, it is important to
assess the fakability of the SDS, so as to measure the validity of
its information.

The literature on the faking of personality and

interest tests indicates that subjects can often ascertain socially
desirable responses, and bias the impressions they give on test
protocols.

Research exploring the fakability of the SDS has suggested

that subjects can fake SDS scores in the more depressed direction,
but not in the less depressed direction.

This finding runs counter

to the literature on the faking of other personality measurements;
on many other tests, subjects can fake-good with regularity.

It is

v
hypothesized that the inability of previous subjects to demonstrate
faking in the less depressed direction on the SDS is due to an
inhibitory effect of the instructional sets and certain statistical
constraints.

If this explanation is accurate, the potential of

faking on the SDS, especially in the less depressed direction has
not been investigated.
This thesis is an attempt to measure that potential of faking
on the SDS.

It is hypothesized that subjects can manipulate SDS

scores in both the

~

and less depressed directions, and that they

will demonstrate this ability when instructed to do so under circumstances designed to counter the statistical constraints operating in
previous investigations.

In the present study, experimental instruc-

tions were designed to facilitate the manipulation of test scores by
removing perceived restraints against responding in the extreme ranges.
Instead of having subjects describe themselves, they were asked to
describe an idealized person who was either completely happy and welladjusted, or completely unhappy and troubled.

This depersonalization

of the instructions was presumed to facilitate responding in

t~e

ex-

treme ranges where subjects describing themselves might hesitate to
answer.

In addition, subjects were asked to respond in this way, even

if the resultant answers seem too obvious or would be blatently untrue
if applied to themselves.

It was expected that i f subjects can deter-

mine the socially desirable, less depressed responses on the SDS, then
with this instructional set, they will demonstrate this manipulatory
ability by scoring significantly lower (less depressed) and higher
(more depressed) than the control group subjects.
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In

ad~ition

to investigating the fakability of the SDS, the

question of applicability of the norms for high school subjects was
also examined.

Subjects vJere drawn from both populations previously

used to explore faking on the SDS:
college and high school students.

there were separate samples of
The use of both these subject

populations permitted an investigation of Mikesell and Calhoun's
(1969) report of elevated "normal" SDS scores in high school students,
and it increased the comparability of the present findings to previous
ones.

The subjects were not divided by sex, as the data from Mikesell

and Calhoun's study (1969) indicated that there were no sex differences in either baseline SDS scores or in the faking of SDS scores.
Thus, this experiment utilized two separate samples, each
divided into three groups (control, fake-good, and fake-bad), totaling
six subject groups in all.
this study.

There were five separate hypotheses for

For the high school sample, it was hypothesized that high

school students would score significantly lower SDS scores than the
high school control group when asked to fake in the less depressed
direction (H1), and significantly higher than their controls when
asked to fake in the more depressed direction (H2) •

For the college

sample, it was hypothesized that college subjects would score significantly lower SDS scores than college control subjects when asked to
fake in the less depressed direction (H3), and

sign~icantly

higher

than their control when asked to fake in the more depressed direction
(H4).

In addition, following the lead of Mikesell and Calhoun (1969),

it was hypothesized that the high school control group would score
significantly higher than the college control group on the SDS, as

r
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evidence of the suggestion of higher baseline SDS norms in younger
subjects (H5).

METHOD
SUBJECTS
Seventy-five high

s~hool

students and 75 college undergradu-

ates participated as subjects in this experiment.

The 75 high school

students were tested at Gordon Technical High School.

All were male;

approximately 2/3 were freshmen, the remaining 1/3 being seniors.
Their ages ranged from 14-19 with a mean of 15.47 (standard deviation
=-1.59 years).
The 75 college subjects were recruited from undergraduate
psychology classes at Loyola University.
were 16 males and 59 females.

Of these subjects, there

Their ages ranged from 18 to 34 with

a mean of 21.90 (standard deviation= 4.19 years).

Although subjects

were drawn from psychology classes, only a minority of the subjects
identified themselves to be psychology majors.
MATERIALS
The Zung Self-rating Depression Scale was administered, according to a revised version by Zung (1974).

The SDS is a 20-item

inventory in which the subject is instructed to rate the presence
and

s~·ength

of each of the 20 symptoms by checking one of the follow-

ing quantitative responses:

none or a little of the time, some of

the time, a good part of the time, most or all of the time.

The

scale items are counter-weighted with equal numbers of positively
30
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and negatively worded statements.
The SDS is constructed so that less depressed subjects obtain
lower scores and more depressed subjects obtain higher ones.

In

scoring the SDS, the quantitative verbal responses are assigned values
~

from 1 to 4, depending on whether the item was worded positively or
negatively, and a total of the raw scores is computed.
can range from 20 to 80.

An

This total

index for the SDS is obtained by dividing

the raw score total by 80 and converting to a whole number which can
range from 25 to 100.

What this index calculation produces is simply

the percentage of the total possible score obtained by the subject.
An SDS index of 50 represents 50% of the depressive pathology re-

ported on the scale.
The scale was transferred to test forms, upon which were
typed the experimental instructions for the separate groups,(see
Appendix B for copies of the test forms for the control group, the
fake-good group, and the fake-bad group, respectively).
Control group subjects were instructed to: "Answer these
items honestly as they apply to you. 11

Fake-good subjects were in-

structed to:
Answer these items so as to create the best possible impression. Try to answer as i f you were describing a
completely happy person without any emotional problems.
Respond in this way even if the answers seem obvious to
you, or would be untrue i f applied to you.
Fake-bad subjects were instructed to:
Answer these items so as to create the worst possible
impression. Try to answer as i f you were describing a
completely unhappy person with many emotional problems.
Respond in this way even i f the answers seem obvious to
you, or would be untrue i f applied to you.
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PROCEDURE
All of the subjects were tested in group administrations
during class hours at their respective schools.

They were randomly

assigned to experimental groups by the following procedure.

The

control, fake-good, and fake-bad forms of the SDS were stacked
alternately before being handed out to the assembled subjects.

As

the test forms were handed out, every third subject became a member
of the same group.

This procedure was employed both to randomly

assign groups, and to minimize any variations from extraneous sources
(such as class seating position, inter-class differences, etc.).
.

Subjects were asked to fill out the questionnaire according
to the instructions printed on each sheet.

Subjects were cautioned

to read the instructions carefully before beginning (at the suggestion
of the high school students' teacher, this point was emphasized with
these subjects).
After collection of all test forms, the subjects were explained the methods and purposes of the experiment, and their reactions
solicited.

To acquire some qualitative information about the faking

of tests, 12 college subjects were

~nterviewed

in an unstructured

manner; they were asked how they went about responding to the faking instruction, which items were most difficult, ,and asked for any
detailed reactions.

These subjects were all selected from the two

faking groups.
Following the data collection, all tests were scored by
the author using the hand scoring key (Zung, 1974b).
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The hypotheses generated from the literature concern only
some of the comparisons of group means that are possible with the
collected data.

Specifically, we are interested in the comparison

between the high school control group and the high school fake-good
group (H1), the high school control and fake-bad groups (H2), the
college control and fake-good groups (H3), the college control and
fake-bad groups (H4), and the two control groups (H5).

Therefore,

the data were analyzed by the method of planned comparisons described
by Winer (1971).

Such a procedure allows the maximum power to detect

significant differences between the group comparisons of

~

priori

theoretical interest, while not examining those comparisons that
would be conceptually meaningless.
The analysis of planned comparisons is essentially a technique that contrasts pairs of group means (in combinations that test
out specific, planned hypotheses) by means of a weighted sum of
group totals.
p.174).

The contrast is then tested as an F ratio (Winer, 1971,

The particular weights chosen to test'the five hypotheses

are listed in Table 1.
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TABLE 1
WEIGHTS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PLANNED

Group

CO~~ARISONS

Hypothesis

H1

H2

H3

H4

H5

1

0

0

0

0

-1

1

0

0

1

0

-1

0

0

0

Fake-Good

0

0

1

0

0

Control

0

0

-1

1

-1

Fake-Bad

0

0

0

-1

0

High School
Fake-Good
Control
Fake-Bad
College

Note.

Derived from a procedure by Winer (1971)

RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The mean SDS scores and standard deviations for the six groups
are listed in Table 2.
ple were:

The mean SDS indices for the high school sam-

fake-good group= 39.64, control group= 43.88, and fake-

bad group= 76.52.

In the college sample, the mean SDS indices were:

fake-good group = 35.72, control group = 44.92, and fake-bad group
= 80.60.

Both of these control group means are noticably higher than

the reported

11

normal" mean SDS scores for adults.

As can be noted from Table 2, the standard deviations for the
control and fake-good groups are similar, but quite different from
the standard deviations obtained from the fake'-bad groups.

This data

is consistent with that reported by Swanson and Anderson (1972):

the

standard deviations for the fake-bad conditions are approximately
twice that for the other two conditions.

It seems likely that this

increased deviation in the fake-bad condition is due to the larger
scoring range available in the more depressed direction on the SDS.
This increased range could result in greater variance within the fakebad groups.
ANALYSIS OF PLANNED

CO~~ARISONS

There were five hypotheses generated in this study; three were
supported by the data.

The results of the analysis of planned compari-

sons are outlined in Table 3.
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TABLE 2
MEAN SDS INDICES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
FOR HIGH SCHOOL AND COLLEGE GROUPS

Group

a

Mean

Standard
Deviation

High School
Fake-Good

39.64

6.94

Control

43.88

6.76

Fake-Bad

76.52

14.40

Fake-Good

35.72

6.57

Control

44.92

7.30

Fake-Bad

80. (:IJ

15.11

College

a

!!

= 25

for all groups

TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF PLANNED COMPARISONS

ss

df

MS

F

H1

224.72

1

224.72

2.068

H2

13,317.12

1

13,317.12

122.558

H3

1,058.00

1

1,058.00

9.737

*

H4

15,913.28

1

15,913.28

146.450

*

H5

13.52

1

13.52

0.124

15,647.52

144

108.66

Comparisons

*

\JJ

-..J

Error

*

-p

< .'o 1 ' F(1, 144)
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High School Sample (Hypotheses H1 and H2)
In the high school sample, those subjects instructed to fake
less depressed on the SDS did not obtain significantly lower scores
than the high school control subjects (F = 2.068, ns).

Hence this

hypothesis was not supported.
The subjects instructed to fake in the more depressed dirrection on the SDS did score significantly higher than the high
school controls (F

=122.558,

p < .01), supporting this hypothesis.

The results from the high school sample are similar to those
reported in previous research on the faking of SDS scores.

High

school subjects were able to fake the SDS significantly more depressed (H2), but were unable to fake significantly in the less depressed direction (H1).
College Sample (Hypotheses H3 and H4)
With the college students, subjects instructed to fake the
SDS in the less depressed direction scored significantly lower than
the college control subjects (F

= 9.737,

p <.01).

This hypothesis

was supported.
Those subjects instructed to fake in the more depressed dirrection obtained significantly higher SDS scores than the control
subjects (F

= 146.450,

p <.01), supporting this hypothesis.
'

Both hypotheses concerning the college sample were supported
by the data.

Both the fake-good (H3) and fake-bad (H4) groups scored

significantly different than the college control group, in their
respective directions.

As expected, the fake-bad group scored
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farther from the control group mean than did the fake-good group.
Comparison of Normal Scores (H5)
The difference between the high school and college control
groups was nonsignificant (f
hypothesis.

= 0.124,

ns), failing to support the

The high school control group mean of 43.88 was slight-

ly lower than Mikesell and Calhoun's (1969) report of 48.35, but
more interestingly, the college control group mean of 44.92 was
considerably higher than Swanson and Anderson's (1972) college
sample mean of 35.1
In sum, the hypothesis that the high school control group
would score higher SDS indices than the college control group was
not supported.

The high school subjects obtained scores somewhat

similar to those previously reported, but the college subjects
scored noticably higher than expected, rendering the comparison
nonsignificant.

DISCUSSION
FAKING LESS DEPRESSED ON THE SDS
The hypothesis that subjects can manipulate SDS scores in
order to appear less depressed was partially supported by the present
data.

College subjects did score significantly lower than their

college control group, but high school subjects did not.

There seem

to be several factors contributing to this finding.
In examining the data in Table 2, it becomes apparent that
the college results proved significant for two statistical reasons.
The college fake-good scores were

noti~eably

lower than those in the

high school fake-good group (Mcol = 35.72 versus Mhs = 39.64); and
secondly, the college control group scored slightly higher than their

=

=

high school counterparts (M
44.92 versus~
42.88). Although
-oo1
~s
both of these factors would tend to increase the significance of
college fake-good versus control group differences, clearly the most
significant contributor was the lower college fake-good scores.

This

indicates that the college subjects manipulated their SDS scores
farther toward the less depressed end of the scale; they did a more
convincing job of faking less depressed.
There are several possible reasons for this, the most salient
being that the college subjects were older than their high school
counterparts (22.16 versus 15.60 years).

It may be that increased

age and experience were related to more effective test faking.

More

41
college subjects seemed to know the depressive implications of the
subtler SDS items, allowing them to fake better than the younger and
less experienced high school subjects.
As an alternate hypothesis to explain these fake-good results,
one might note the sex differences in group composition.

With the

high school group being all male and the college group 80% female,
one might suggest that the results reflect greater faking abilities
in female subjects.

This suggestion, however, runs counter to the

previously reported finding that there were no sex differences in
either control group or faking group SDS scores (Mikesell & Calhoun,
1969).

As a result, this interpretation seems unsupported at present.
An analysis of the scores from the high school fake-good

group tentatively supports the suggestion that age differences between the groups were primarily responsible for the college group's
greater ability to manipulate SDS scores.

The high school groups

were composed of roughly 2/3 freshmen (aged 14-15) and 1/3 seniors
(aged 18-19).

When the high school scores are divided by age (fresh-

men versus seniors), one

not~s

that the freshmen (!!

= 19)

obtained

an SDS mean of 40.79; while the seniors in the same group (!!
averaged an SDS score of 36.00.

= 6)

This high school senior mean of

36.00 is almost identical to the college fake-good mean of 35.72,
and noticably lower than the freshmen score.

The difference between

the senior and freshmen means was tested post hoc by·means of a
!-test, but failed to reach significance (!

= 1.48, B = .08).

This

is not surprising in view of the small number of scores in such an
intragroup comparison.

Even though the difference between the

freshmen and senior high school subjects was not statistically significant, the trend of the data does offer speculative support for
the notion that older subjects can more effectively bias SDS scores
in the less depressed direction.
Interview data from the college subjects revealed several
interesting aspects of the faking process that may explain the failure
of previous efforts at faking in the less depressed direction.

Many

of the items were obvious and offered no challenge to determine nondepressed responses.

Some, however, were perceived as being more

difficult to manipulate.

The items pointed out as being most diffi-

cult were the subtler ones, especially item 2 ( 11 Morning is when I
feel the best 11 ) , item 4 (11 I have trouble sleeping through the night"),
item 5 ( 11 I eat as much as I used to 11 ) and item 7 ( 11 I notice that I
am losing weight").

In these cases, subjects were often unsure of

how to respond in order to appear less depressed.

A common response

strategy was that many of the subjects used themselves as

11

anchor

points 11 when attempting to answer the subtler items, seeing themselves as examples of nondepressed persons.

They based their re-

sponses to these items on their own preferences.
This strategy, however, is not always accurate.

One can

often end up responding in the opposite direction than planned.
Item 7, concerning weight loss, must be answered

11

of the time" to appear less depressed than normal.

none or a little
.Yet, one female

subject, using herself as an anchor point, responded 11 most or all
of the time 11 when attempting to fake-good.

Being somewhat overweight,

she perceived weight loss positively, and hence a counterindication
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of depression in her own experience.

Weight loss is positively

related to depression on the SDS.
Other personalizations of the test items did aid subjects in
faking efforts.

One fake-good subject knew the appropriate direction

to answer item 2 ("Morning is when I feel the best") because she
reported experiencing difficulties in the mornings during depressive
episodes in her own life.
When responding to uncertain items, subjects often ans'tvered
in the moderate response catagories, instead of answering 11 none 11 or
"all of the time", presumably to minimize any error they might :make
in choosing inappropriate answers.

These moderate responses act to

reduce the significance of any differences between faking groups and
control groups.

However, many of the items were marked in the center

categories in both faking groups, even on relatively obvious items.
It is uncertain why subjects responded in this way, as extreme responses are needed to appear significantly less or more depressed
than normal.
A

response strategy noted by several of the subjects has

bearing on the previous failures to demonstrate faking in the less
depressed direction (Mikesell & Calhoun, 1969; Swanson & Anderson,
1972).

Subjects explained that when they read the fake-good in-

structions, many assumed themselves to be basically happy and welladjusted, and therefore described themselves when responding in the
fake-good condition.

They interpreted the experimental instructions

in such a way that these fake-good subjects and the control subjects
were responding to essentially the same directions: ndescribe your-
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self".

It is clear that such a strategy would attenuate any suspected

differences between the control and fake-good groups.

'Vlith instruc-

tions such as Mikesell and Calhoun's (1969), where subjects are asked
to describe "best impressions" of themselves, any such personalizing
tendencies might be exaggerated and could lead to reduced differences
between fake-good and control group totals--exactly the results reported in both previous attempts to investigate faking on the SDS.
It is presumed that the depersonalization of the instructions in the
present study minimized this strategy to the level where one could
observe significant differences between the college control and fakegood groups.
Summary
The hypothesis that subjects can fake in the less depressed
direction on the SDS was partially supported.

There seems to be a

clear distinction between the faking performance of younger and
older subjects, with the older college subjects being able to bias
SDS scores in order to appear significantly less depressed than
controls.

Several factors revealed in post-test interviews suggest

that some of the reasons for previous nonsignificant findings may
have been due to the response strategies of many subjects, which
were encouraged by the particular instructions used in previous
research.

These response strategies act to attenuate any difference

between control and fake-good group totals.

The instructions employed

in the present study are presumed to have discouraged such strategies
to the point where they did not negate significant differences between the college fake-good and control groups.
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This positive finding suggests that clinicians should be
careful about relying on SDS information when testing individuals
who might have something to gain by appearing less depressed than
they actually are.

The present results support the contention that

patients may be able to fake less depressed on the SDS.
FAKING MORE DEPRESSED ON THE SDS
The results indicate that experimental subjects did manipulate
SDS scores in order to appear

~

depressed than control subjects.

This was supported with both college and high school samples, and is
consistent with previous investigations.
The fake-bad group means of 76.52 and 80.60

were significantly

higher than control means, and fall into the range described as
verly depressed" by Zung (1973).

11

se-

Interpreting this evidence with

that previously reported, it is quite clear that faking toward more
depressed scores on the SDS is easily accomplished.

Those using the

depression scale in clinical settings should be careful about analyzing unusually high SDS scores, or about relying on SDS information
when diagnosing or treating individuals suspected of malingering, or
having other reason to appear more depressed than might be the case.
Interestingly, as in the fake-good groups, there seems to be
the suggestion of an age effect in faking-bad on the SDS, with older
subjects again more successful at test manipulation.

In the high

school fake-bad group, the 19 freshmen obtained a mean score of
75.32; while the six seniors in the group obtained a mean of 80.33-almost identical to the overall college fake-bad mean of 80.60.

The

difference between the freshmen and senior high school subjects was
tested post-hoc by means of a !-test, but found to be nonsignificant
(t

=0.71, p =ns).

Although an age effect was found to be nonsig-

nificant within the high school group, such a tendency is consistent
.~·

. .;.,·

with the author's impressions of the seriousness and maturity with
which the younger and older subjects attended to the task.

The high

school seniors and college subjects seemed subjectively more mature
and involved in the experiment.

This impression should, of course,

be considered tentatively.
Summary
The present study is consistent with other research in reporting that subjects can appear wBXkedly more depressed on the SDS
than is actually the case.

Combining these findings with those that

indicate positive results when attempting to fake-good, it becomes
apparent that contrary to previous reports, the SDS is open to manipulation in both directions.

Clinical and research users of the SDS

should be cautious in relying on SDS data alone to determine the
strength of depressive symptoms.

As with other assessment

techniques~

valid information from the SDS requires a cooperative relationship
between subject and examiner.

Only when the test subject perceives

the assessment as a cooperative effort can we be sure that the inventory's data is an accurate assessment of the patient's experience
of his depressive symptoms.

"NORMAL" SDS SCORES
The results did not support the hypothesis that high school

control subjects would score higher on the SDS than their college
counterparts:

the difference between the two control groups was

nonsignificant.
To understand this finding, a review of the previous research
is in order.

Mikesell and Calhoun (1969) suggested that the mean

normal SDS index for high school students was much higher than Zung's
(1965) data would indicate.

t

Zung reported the adult normal SDS score

was 35; Mikesell and Calhoun found high school control group means
averaging 48.35, a sizable difference.

J

They used high school juniors

as subjects, who are commonly from 16 to 17 years old, although they
did not report age data for their sample.
Swanson and Anderson (1972) tested college-aged subjects
(mean age= 22.1 years) and obtained a control group mean of 35.1 on
the SDS--quite similar to Zung's adult figure of 33.

This result

suggested that college control subjects would accurately mirror the
adult normal scores for the purposes of this experiment.

Because

both high school and college populations were to be tested in the

II

present study, it was expected that a comparison between the high
school and college control groups would measure the hypothesized
difference between high school and adult normal SDS scores.

The

present college control group mean age was 21.92, comparing quite
closely with Swanson and Anderson's sample.
Ho~ver,

the comparison did not prove to be an effective

test of the hypothesis, because the college controls scored much
higher SDS indices than expected.

Their mean of 44.92 was elevated

far beyond Zung's (1965) or Swanson and Anderson's data would predict.

The high school control group mean of 43.88 was also higher than the
published normal scores, but not quite as high as Mikesell and Calhoun's (1969) suggestion.

The comparison between them was nonsig-

nificant because both groups were elevated to the same level.

Why

did the control groups score so high?
The elevations of these normal score estimates is consistent
with a trend in the SDS literature toward raising the estimated SDS
"normal" score.

Zung (1965) originally reported normals averaged

33 on the SDS.

He later revised his estimate to 37 in a cross-cul-

tural study (1969), and finally reported that a combination of much
eXisting data suggested a more accurate report of the normal mean
would be 39 (Zung, 1972).

He also cautioned that SDS baseline scores

in younger and older subjects (younger than 20 and older than 65) were
likely to be higher still.

An SDS mean of 48 was found in testing a

group of normal elderly subjects, aged 65 to 95

(Z1L~g,

1967b).

The present normal means of 43.88 and 44.92 seem to support
this notion of increased SDS baselines in young subjects.

The higher

baseline levels would suggest that younger and older subjects as a
group experience more of the symptoms related to depression than do
middle-aged adults.

Zung (1967b) reports this to be the case with

his older subjects.

The present data suggests it may also apply to

adolescents and college-aged individuals.

Adolescence is a particu-

larly stressful period of development, and this stress could manifest
itself by increased depressive symptomatology reported by younger
persons.

An

alternate hypothesis to explain the increased baseline

SDS levels in younger and older populations is that the SDS might
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be biased toward those depressive symptoms that are most often experienced by these populations.

More data is needed, however, to

explore this interpretation.
This evidence warrants the use of caution when interpreting
SDS scores for high school or college-aged individuals.

Although

most of these subjects will fall into the "normal" range of SDS
scores, there is an increased probability of misdiagnosis of depression when using norms developed on adult populations with younger
test subjects.

A more detailed examination of the norms for all age

groups is clearly needed.
Summary
The hypothesis that high school subjects would score higher
SDS indices than normal college-aged subjects was not supported;
but apparently because both the high school and college groups scorea
higher than expected, thus rendering the comparison nonsignificant.
This evidence is consistent with a trend in the SDS literature that
has gradually increased the estimated normal SDS mean to 39, and has
indicated that younger and older subjects tend to obtain higher average SDS scores.

It may be that these younger and older populations

are, in fact, more depressed than normal, or it may simply reflect a
bias in the test items toward those depressive symptoms experienced
more often by these populations.

Caution is suggested when inter-

preting high SDS scores for high school and college individuals; and
a more extensive investigation of SDS norms for all age groups is
called for.

SUMMARY

This investigation examined the potential of test faking
on the Self-rating Depression Scale.
was asked:

Specifically, the question

can the SDS be manipulated to appear both

less depressed?

~

and

Previous research had demonstrated successful

faking toward more depressed scores, but had been unable to show
faking toward less depressed scores.

This finding runs counter to

the literature on the faking of other personality and diagnostic
tests; many other instruments have been successfully faked in the
positive or less abnormal direction.
It was hypothesized that previous failures to demonstrate
faking toward less depressed scores on the SDS were the result of
1) statistical constraints that required fake-good subjects to
score in the extreme categories in order to appear significantly
less depressed than controls, and 2) the possibly inhibitory effect
of personalized instructions that might attenuate differences between the control and fake-good groups.
The present study employed different experimental instructions that were depersonalized to facilitate responding in the
extreme scoring categories.

It also tested both populations pre-

viously used to explore faking on the SDS:

high school and college

students.
Results indicated that college aged fake-good subjects
scored significantly lower SDS indices than controls; however, the
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younger high school fake-good subjects did not obtain significantly
lower scores than their control group.
sized as mediating this performance.

An age effect was hypotheOlder subjects (aged 18 and

over) could more effectively manipulate the SDS to appear less depressed than controls.

Both the high school and college fake-bad

groups scored significantly higher than controls, reaffirming the
demonstration of the fakability of the SDS toward more depressed
scores.

Again, the older college subjects were slightly more ef-

fective at this.
Clinicians are advised to interpret cautiously SDS scores
when dealing with patients who might have something to gain by
distorting information revealed on a depression scale.

Evidence

indicates that individuals can manipulate the SDS to appear more or
less depressed than they actually are.

A cooperative subject-ex-

aminer relationship is suggested as the most effective way to control
such distortions.
An

also noted.

interesting finding concerning the control groups was
It was suggested from previous research that high

school control subjects would score higher than the published SDS
normal levels.

This hypothesis was tested by comparing the high

school and college control groups.

It was found, however, that

both control groups scored considerably higher than expected, achieving similarly elevated mean SDS scores.

The comparison was there-

fore nonsignificant, but the elevation of both control group means
was consistent with evidence suggesting an increase in the estimation
of the

11

normal mean 11 SDS score, and with evidence pointing to
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increased SDS baselines in younger (than 20) and older (than 65)
individuals.

Caution is urged when interpreting moderately ele-

vated SDS scores with these populations.

'
j
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ZUNG'S CRITERIA FOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS

I.

II.

III.

IV.

Pervasive affective disturbances
1. Depressed, sad and blue
2. Tearful
Physiological disturbances
1. Diurnal variation: exaggeration of symptoms in the early
morning and some relief as the day goes on
2. Sleep: characteristically early or frequent waking
3. Appetite: decreased food intake
4. Weight loss: associated with decreased food intake, or
increased metabolism and decreased rest
5. Sex: decreased libido
6. Gastrointestinal: constipation
7. Cardiovascular : tachycardia
8. Musculoskeletal: fatigue
Psychomotor disturbances
1. Agitation
2. Retardation
Psychological disturbances
1. Confusion
2. F_l!lptiness
3. Hopelessness
4. Indecisiveness
5. Irritability
6. Dissatisfaction
7. Personal devaluation
8. Suicidal rumination
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Answar these items honestly as they apply to you.

Age

Sc•

---

Dote

None OR
o little
of the Time

Some of
the Tome

Good Port
of the Time

Most OR All
of the Time

.I. I fP.el down-hearted, blue and sod
2. Morning is when I feel the best
3. I hove crying spells or feel like it
4. I hove tro~ble sleeping through the night
5. I eat os much os I used to

6. I en,oy looking ot, talking to and being
with attractive women I men
7. I notice that I _om losing weight
8. I hove trouble with constipation

9. My heart beats foster than usual

10. I get tired for no reason
11. My mind is os clear os it used to be
12. I lind it easy to do the things I used to
13. I om restless and con t keep stiil
14. I feel hopeful about the future
15. I am more irritable than usual
I 6. I lind it easy to make decisions

--1---

-

I 7. I feel that I am useful and needed

18. My life is pretty full
19. I feel !hot others would be better off if I were dead

20. I still enjoy the things I used to do

CG

J
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Answer these itecs so as to create the best possible
impression. Try to answer as if you were describing someone
who was completely happy and without any emotional problems.
Respond in this way even if the answers seem obvious to you,
or if they would be untrue if applied to you,

Age
·1:
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
1 I.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Sex

---

Dote

I feel down-hearted, blue and sod
Morning is when I feel lhe best
I hove crying spells or feel like it
I hove trouble sleeping through the nrght
I eot os much os I used lo
I enjoy looking ot, talking to end being
with oltroclive women/men
I notice thai I om losing weight
I hove !rouble with conslrpolion
My hcorl bears foster than usual
I get lired for no reason
My mind _is os clear as it used fo be
I find it ~?~Y to do the things I used to
I om restless and con t keep still
I feel hopeful oboul the future
I om more irritable lhon usual
I find it cosy ro make decisions
I fccllhot I om useful and needed
My life is prefly full
I feel lhot others would be better off if I were deed
I still enjoy the things I used lo do

None OR
o Lillie
of the Time

Some of
the Time

Good Pori

of

!nc

Time

Most OR All
of the Time

-

---

------

r------

----

- r---

----·

------

l
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Answer these items so as to create the worst possible
impression. Try to answer as if you were describing someone
who was completely unhappy and with many emotional problems,
Respond in this way even if the answers seem obvious to you,
or if they would be untrue if applied to you.

Age

.

Sex

---

None OR
o Little
of the Time

Dote

Some of
the Time

Good Port
of rne Time

Most OR All
of the Time

1. I f~el down-hearted, blue and sod
2. Morning is when I feel the best
3. I hove crying spells or feel like it

'

4. I hove trouble sleeping through the night
5. I eat as much as I used to
6. I enjoy looking at, talking to and being
with attractive women/men

7. I notice that I om losing weight
8. I hove trouble with constipation
9. My heart beats foster than usual
10. I get tired for no reason
11. My mind is as clear as it used to be
12. I find it cosy to do the things I used to
13. I om rest less and con I keep still
14. I feel hopeful about the future
15. I om more irritable than usual

-1--·

16. I find it cosy to make decisions
17. I feel that I om useful and needed

--

·---

18. My life is pretty full
19. I feel that others would be better off if I were dead
20. I still enjoy the things I used to do
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